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Abstract
Consider a gambler who observes a sequence of independent, non-negative random numbers and is
allowed to stop the sequence at any time, claiming a reward equal to the most recent observation. The
famous prophet inequality of Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling asserts that a gambler who knows the
distribution of each random variable can achieve at least half as much reward, in expectation, as a
“prophet” who knows the sampled values of each random variable and can choose the largest one. We
generalize this result to the setting in which the gambler and the prophet are allowed to make more
than one selection, subject to a matroid constraint. We show that the gambler can still achieve at least
half as much reward as the prophet; this result is the best possible, since it is known that the ratio
cannot be improved even in the original prophet inequality, which corresponds to the special case of
rank-one matroids. Generalizing the result still further, we show that under an intersection of p matroid
constraints, the prophet’s reward exceeds the gambler’s by a factor of at most O(p), and this factor is
also tight.
Beyond their interest as theorems about pure online algoritms or optimal stopping rules, these results
also have applications to mechanism design. Our results imply improved bounds on the ability of sequen-
tial posted-price mechanisms to approximate Bayesian optimal mechanisms in both single-parameter and
multi-parameter settings. In particular, our results imply the first efficiently computable constant-factor
approximations to the Bayesian optimal revenue in certain multi-parameter settings.
∗Department of Computer Science, Cornell University.
†Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, MIT.
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1 Introduction
In 1978, Krengel, Sucheston and Garling [17] proved a surprising and fundamental result about the relative
power of online and offline algorithms in Bayesian settings. They showed that if X1, X2, . . . , Xn is a sequence
of independent, non-negative, real-valued random variables and E [maxiXi] <∞, then there exists a stopping
rule τ such that
2 · E [Xτ ] ≥ E
[
max
i
Xi
]
. (1)
In other words, if we consider a game in which a player observes the sequence X1, X2, . . . , Xn and is allowed to
terminate the game at any time, collecting the most recently observed reward, then a prophet who can foretell
the entire sequence and stop at its maximum value can gain at most twice as much payoff as a player who
must choose the stopping time based only on the current and past observations. The inequality (1) became
the first1 of many “prophet inequalities” in optimal stopping theory. Expressed in computer science terms,
these inequalities compare the performance of online algorithms versus the offline optimum for problems that
involve selecting one or more elements from a random sequence, in a Bayesian setting where the algorithm
knows the distribution from which the sequence will be sampled whereas the offline optimum knows the
values of the samples themselves and chooses among them optimally. Not surprisingly, these inequalities
have important applications in the design and analysis of algorithms, especially in algorithmic mechanism
design, a connection that we discuss further below.
In this paper, we prove a prophet inequality for matroids, generalizing the original inequality (1) which
corresponds to the special case of rank-one matroids. More specifically, we analyze the following online
selection problem. One is given a matroid whose elements have random weights sampled independently from
(not necessarily identical) probability distributions on R+. An online algorithm, initialized with knowledge
of the matroid structure and of the distribution of each element’s weight, must select an independent subset
of the matroid by observing the sampled value of each element (in a fixed, prespecified order) and making an
immediate decision whether or not to select it before observing the next element. The algorithm’s payoff is
defined to be the sum of the weights of the selected elements. We prove in this paper that for every matroid,
there is an online algorithm whose expected payoff is least half of the expected weight of the maximum-
weight basis. It is well known that the factor 2 in Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling’s inequality (1) cannot
be improved (see Section 5 for a lower bound example) and therefore our result for matroids is the best
possible, even in the rank-one case.
Our algorithm is quite simple. At its heart lies a new algorithm for achieving the optimal factor 2 in
rank-one matroids: compute a threshold value T = E [maxiXi]/2 and accept the first element whose weight
exceeds this threshold. This is very similar to the algorithm of Samuel-Cahn [19], which uses a threshold T
such that Pr(maxiXi > T ) =
1
2 but is otherwise the same, and which also achieves the optimal factor 2. It is
hard to surpass the elegance of Samuel-Cahn’s proof, and indeed our proof, though short and simple, is not
as elegant. On the other hand, our algorithm for rank-one matroids has a crucial advantage over Samuel-
Cahn’s: it generalizes to arbitrary matroids without weakening its approximation factor. The generalization
is as follows. The algorithm pretends that the online selection process is Phase 1 of a two-phase game; after
each Xi has been revealed in Phase 1 and the algorithm has accepted some set A1, Phase 2 begins. In Phase
2, a new weight will be sampled for every matroid element, independently of the Phase 1 weights, and the
algorithm will play the role of the prophet on the Phase 2 weights, choosing the max-weight subset A2 such
that A1∪A2 is independent. However, the payoff for choosing an element in Phase 2 is only half of its weight.
When observing element i and deciding whether to select it, our algorithm can be interpreted as making
the choice that would maximize its expected payoff if Phase 1 were to end immediately after making this
decision and Phase 2 were to begin. Of course, Phase 2 is purely fictional: it never actually takes place, but
it plays a key role in both the design and the analysis of the algorithm. Note that this algorithm, specialized
to rank-one matroids, is precisely the one proposed at the start of this paragraph: the expected value of
1More precisely, it was the second prophet inequality. The same inequality with a factor of 4, instead of 2, was discovered a
year earlier by Krengel and Sucheston [16].
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proceeding to Phase 2 without selecting anything would be T = E [maxiXi]/2, hence our algorithm picks an
element if and only if its weight exceeds T .
We next extend our algorithm to the case in which the feasibility constraint is given by a matroid
intersection rather than a single matroid. For intersections of p matroids, we present an online algorithm
whose expected payoff is at least 14p−2 times the expected maximum weight of a feasible set. The algorithm
is a natural extension of the one described earlier. It again imagines a fictional Phase 2 in which new
independent random weights are sampled for all elements and revealed simultaneously, and the payoff for
selecting an element in Phase 2 equals half of its weight. This time, we let M2 denote the max-weight feasible
set of Phase 2 elements, designate one of the p matroids uniformly at random, and allow the algorithm to
choose any A2 ⊆ M2 such that A1 ∪ A2 is independent in the designated matroid. Observe that this is in
fact a generalization of our algorithm for a single matroid, as enforcing A2 ⊆M2 is a vacuous constraint for
a single matroid. In Section 5 we show that our result for matroid intersections is almost tight: we present
a lower bound demonstrating that the ratio 4p− 2 cannot be improved by more than a constant factor.
As mentioned earlier, Bayesian optimal mechanism design problems provide a compelling application of
prophet inequalities in computer science and economics. In Bayesian optimal mechanism design, one has
a collection of n agents with independent private types sampled from known distributions, and the goal
is to design a mechanism for allocating resources and charging prices to the agents, given their reported
types, so as to maximize the seller’s expected revenue in equilibrium. Chawla et al. [5] pioneered the study
of approximation guarantees for sequential posted pricings (SPMs), a very simple class of mechanisms in
which the seller makes a sequence of take-it-or-leave-it offers to the agents, with each offer specifying an
item and a price that the agent must pay in order to win the item. Despite their simplicity, sequential
posted pricings were shown in [5] to approximate the optimal revenue in many different settings. Prophet
inequalities constitute a key technique underlying these results; instead of directly analyzing the revenue of
the SPM, one analyzes the so-called virtual values of the winning bids, proving via prophet inequalities that
the combined expected virtual value accumulated by the SPM approximates the offline optimum. Translating
this virtual-value approximation guarantee into a revenue guarantee is an application of standard Bayesian
mechanism design techniques introduced by Roger Myerson [18]. In the course of developing these results,
Chawla et al. prove a type of prophet inequality for matroids that is of considerable interest in its own right:
they show that if the algorithm is allowed to specify the order in which the matroid elements are observed,
then it can guarantee an expected payoff at least half as large as the prophet’s. Our result can be seen as a
strengthening of theirs, achieving the same approximation bound without allowing the algorithm to reorder
the elements. Unlike our setting, in which the factor 2 is known to be tight, the best known lower bound for
algorithms that may reorder the elements is
√
pi/2 ∼= 1.25.
Extending the aforementioned results from single-parameter to multi-parameter domains, Chawla et al.
define in [5] a general class of multi-parameter mechanism design problems called Bayesian multi-parameter
unit-demand (BMUMD). SPMs in this setting are not truthful but can be modified to yield mechanisms
that approximate the Bayesian optimal revenue with respect to a weaker solution concept: implementation
in undominated strategies. A narrower class of mechanisms called oblivious posted pricings (OPMs) yields
truthful mechanisms, but typically with weaker approximation guarantees; for example, it is not known
whether OPMs can yield constant-factor approximations to the Bayesian optimal revenue in matroid settings,
except for special cases such as graphic matroids. Without resolving this question, our results lead to an
equally strong positive result for BMUMD: truthful mechanisms that 2-approximate the Bayesian optimal
revenue in matroid settings and (4p − 2)-approximate it in settings defined by an intersection of p matroid
constraints.
1.1 Related work
The genesis of prophet inequalities in the work of Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling [16, 17] was discussed
earlier. It would be impossible in this amount of space to do justice to the extensive literature on prophet
inequalities. Of particular relevance to our work are the so-called multiple-choice prophet inequalities in
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which either the gambler, the prophet, or both are given the power to choose more than one element.
While several papers have been written on this topic, e.g. [12, 13, 14], the near-optimal solution of the most
natural case, in which both the gambler and the prophet have k > 1 choices, was not completed until the
work of Alaei [1], who gave a factor-(1 − 1/√k + 3)−1 prophet inequality for k-choice optimal stopping; a
nearly-matching lower bound of 1 + Ω(k−1/2) was already known from prior work.
Research on the relationship between algorithmic mechanism design and prophet inequalities was initi-
ated by Hajiaghayi, Kleinberg, and Sandholm [11], who observed that algorithms used in the derivation of
prophet inequalities, owing to their monotonicity properties, could be interpreted as truthful online auction
mechanisms and that the prophet inequality in turn could be interpreted as the mechanism’s approximation
guarantee. Chawla et al. [5] discovered a much subtler relation between the two subjects: questions about
the approximability of offline Bayesian optimal mechanisms by sequential posted-price mechanisms could
be translated into questions about prophet inequalities, via the use of virtual valuation functions. A fuller
discussion of their contributions appears earlier in this section. Recent work by Alaei [1] deepens still further
the connections between these two research areas, obtaining a near-optimal k-choice prophet inequality and
applying it to a much more general Bayesian combinatorial auction framework than that studied in [5].
While not directly related to our work, the matroid secretary problem [3] also concerns relations between
optimal stopping and matroids, this time under the assumption of a randomly ordered input, rather than
independent random numbers in a fixed order. In fact, the “hard examples” for many natural examples in
the matroid-secretary setting also translate into hard examples for the prophet inequality setting. In light
of this relation, it is intriguing that our work solves the matroid prophet inequality problem whereas the
matroid secretary problem remains unsolved, despite intriguing progress on special cases [7, 15], general
matroids [4], and relaxed versions of the problem [21].
Finally, the Bayesian online selection problem that we consider here can be formulated as an exponential-
sized Markov decision process, whose state reflects the entire set of decisions made prior to a specified point
during the algorithm’s execution. Thus, our paper can be interpreted as a contribution to the growing CS
literature on approximate solutions of exponential-sized Markov decision processes, e.g. [6, 9, 10]. Most of
these papers use LP-based techniques. Combinatorial algorithms based on simple thresholding rules, such
as ours, are comparatively rare although there are some other examples in the literature on such problems,
for example [8].
2 Preliminaries
Bayesian online selection problems. An instance of the Bayesian online selection problem (BOSP)
is specified by a ground set U , a downward-closed set system I ⊆ 2U , and for each x ∈ U a probability
distribution Fx supported on the set R+ of non-negative real numbers. These data determine a probability
distribution over functions w : U → R+, in which the random variables {w(x) | x ∈ U} are independent and
w(x) has distribution Fx. We refer to w(x) as the weight of x, and we extend w to an additive set function
defined on 2U by w(A) =
∑
x∈A w(x). Elements of I are called feasible sets. For a given assignment of
weights, w, we let MAX(w) denote the maximum-weight feasible set and OPT(w) denotes its weight; we will
abbreviate these to MAX and OPT when the weights w are clear from context.
An input sequence is a sequence σ of ordered pairs (xi, wi) i = 1, . . . , n, each belonging to U × R+, such
that every element of U occurs exactly once in the sequence x1, . . . , xn. A deterministic online selection
algorithm is a function A mapping every input sequence σ to a set A(σ) ∈ I such that for any two input
sequences σ, σ′ that match on the first i pairs (x1, w1), . . . , (xi, wi), the sets Ai(σ) = A(σ) ∩ {1, . . . , i} and
Ai(σ
′) = A(σ′)∩{1, . . . , i} are identical. A randomized online selection algorithm is a probability distribution
over deterministic ones. The algorithm’s choices define decision variables bi(σ) which are indicator functions
of the events xi ∈ A(σ). An algorithm is monotone if increasing the value of wi (while leaving the rest of
σ unchanged) cannot decrease the value of E [bi(σ)], where the expectation is over the algorithm’s internal
randomness but not the randomness of σ (if any). A monotone deterministic online selection algorithm
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can be completely described by a sequence of thresholds T1(σ), . . . , Tn(σ), where Ti(σ) ∈ R+ ∪ {∞} is the
infimum of the set of weights w such that i ∈ A(σ′) when σ′ is obtained from σ by modifying wi to w.
Conversely, for any sequence of threshold functions T1, . . . , Tn such that Ti(σ) depends only on the first i−1
elements of σ and Ti(σ) =∞ whenever Ai−1(σ) ∪ {i} 6∈ I, there is a corresponding monotone deterministic
online selection algorithm that selects xi whenever wi ≥ Ti(σ).
Notice that an algorithm as defined above is agnostic to the order in which the matroid elements will be
presented, i.e. it has a well-defined behavior no matter what order the elements appear in the input sequence.
One could also consider order-aware algorithms that know the entire sequence x1, . . . , xn in advance (but not
the weights w1, . . . , wn). In the matroid setting, our factor-2 prophet inequality for order-agnostic algorithms
reveals that order-aware algorithms have no advantage over order-agnostic ones in the worst case; it is an
interesting open question whether the same lack of advantage holds more generally.
One can similarly distinguish between adversaries with respect to their power to choose the ordering
of the sequence. The original BOSP treated in previous work [16, 17] considers a fixed-order adversary.
That is, the adversary chooses an ordering (or distribution over orderings) for revealing the elements of U
without knowing any of the weights w(x). Our main result is an algorithm that achieves 12OPT (or
1
4p−2OPT)
against a fixed-order adversary. This result combined with the techniques of [5] immediately yields OPMs for
single-parameter mechanism design. To extend our results to BMUMD, we must consider a stronger type of
adversary. There are many ways that an adversary could adapt to the sampled weights and/or the algorithm’s
decisions, some more powerful than others. The type of adaptivity that is relevant to our paper will be called
an online weight-adaptive adversary. An online weight-adaptive adversary chooses the next element of U
to reveal one at a time. After choosing x1, . . . , xi−1 and learning w(x1), . . . , w(xi−1), the online weight-
adaptive adversary chooses the next xi to reveal without knowing the weight w(xi) (or any weights besides
w(x1), . . . , w(xi−1)). Fortunately, the same exact proof shows that our algorithm, without any modification,
also achieves 12OPT (or
1
4p−2OPT) against an online weight-adaptive adversary. The connection between
BMUMD and online weight-adaptive adversaries is not trivial, and is explained in Section 6.
Matroids. A matroid M consists of a ground set U and a nonempty downward-closed set system I ⊆ 2U
satisfying the matroid exchange axiom: for all pairs of sets I, J ∈ I such that |I| < |J |, there exists an
element x ∈ J such that I ∪ {x} ∈ I. Elements of I are called independent sets when (U , I) is a matroid.
A maximal independent set is called a basis. If A is a subset of U , its rank, denoted by rank(A), is the
maximum cardinality of an independent subset of A. Its closure or span, denoted by cl(A), is the set of all
x ∈ U such that rank(A ∪ {x}) = rank(A). It is well known that the following greedy algorithm selects a
maximum-weight basis of a matroid: number the elements of U as x1, . . . , xn in decreasing order of weight,
and select the set of all xi such that xi 6∈ cl({x1, . . . , xi−1}).
3 Algorithms for Matroids
In this section we prove our main theorem, asserting the existence of algorithms whose expected reward is
at least 12OPT when playing against any online weight-adaptive adversary. Here is some intuition as to the
considerations guiding the design of our algorithm. Imagine a prophet that is forced to start by accepting the
set A, and let the remainder of A (denoted R(A), defined formally in the following section) denote the subset
that the restricted prophet adds to A. Let the cost of A (denoted C(A), defined formally in the following
section) denote the subset that the unrestricted prophet selected in place of A. Then the restricted prophet
makes w(A) +E [w(R(A))] in expectation, while the unrestricted prophet makes E [w(C(A))] +E [w(R(A))].
So if A satisfies w(A) ≥ 1αE [w(C(A))] for a small constant α, it is not so bad to get stuck holding set A.
However, just because A is not a bad set to start with does not mean we shouldn’t accept anything that
comes later. After all, the empty set is not a bad set to start with. If we can choose A in a way such
that for any V we reject with A ∪ V ∈ I, w(V ) ≤ 1αE [w(R(A))], then A is not a bad set to finish with.
Simply put, we want to choose thresholds that are large enough to guarantee that w(A) compares well to
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E [w(C(A))], but small enough to guarantee that everything we reject is not too heavy. Indeed, the first step
in our analysis is to define this property formally and show that an algorithm with this property obtains a
1
α -approximation.
3.1 Detour: The rank-one case
To introduce the ideas underlying our algorithm and its analysis, we start with a very simple analysis of the
case of rank-one matroids. This is the special case of the problem in which the algorithm is only allowed to
make one selection, i.e. the same setting as the original prophet inequality (1). Thus, the algorithm given in
this section can be regarded as providing a new and simple proof of that inequality.
Let the random weights of the elements by denoted by X1, . . . , Xn, and let T = E [maxiXi]/2. We will
show that an algorithm that stops at the first time τ such that Xτ ≥ T makes at least T in expectation. Let
p = Pr[maxiXi ≥ T ]. Then we get the following inequality, for any x > T :
Pr[Xτ > x] ≥ (1− p)
n∑
i=1
Pr[Xi > x]
This is true because with probability 1−p the algorithm accepts nothing, so with probability at least (1−p)
it has accepted nothing by the time it processes Xi. So the probability that the algorithm accepts Xi and
that Xi > x is at least (1− p) Pr[Xi > x]. It is also clear, by the union bound, that
n∑
i=1
Pr[Xi > x] ≥ Pr[max
i
Xi > x]
and therefore, for all x > T ,
Pr[Xτ > x] ≥ (1− p) Pr[max
i
Xi > x].
Now, observe that E [maxiXi] =
∫ T
0
Pr[maxiXi > x] dx+
∫∞
T
Pr[maxiXi > x] dx = 2T . As the first term is
clearly at most T , the second term must be at least T . So finally, we write:
E[Xτ ] =
∫ T
0
Pr[Xτ > x] dx+
∫ ∞
T
Pr[Xτ > x] dx
≥ pT + (1− p)
∫ ∞
T
Pr[max
i
Xi > x] dx
≥ pT + (1− p)T = T = 1
2
E
[
max
i
Xi
]
which completes the proof of (1).
3.2 A property guaranteeing α-approximation
To design and analyze algorithms for general matroids, we begin by defining a property of a deterministic
monotone algorithm that we refer to as α-balanced thresholds. In this section we prove that the expected
reward of any such algorithm is at least 1αOPT. In the following section we construct an algorithm with
2-balanced thresholds, completing the proof of the main theorem.
To define α-balanced thresholds, we must first define some notation. Let w,w′ : U → R+ denote two
assignments of weights to U , both sampled indepedently from the given distribution. We consider running
the algorithm on an input sequence σ = (x1, w(x1)), . . . , (xn, w(xn)) and comparing the value of its selected
set, A = A(σ), with that of the basis B that maximizes w′(B). The matroid exchange axiom ensures that
there is at least one way to partition B into disjoint subsets C,R such that A ∪ R is also a basis of M.
(Consider adding elements of B one-by-one to A, preserving membership in I, until the two sets have equal
cardinality, and let R be the set of elements added to A.) Among all such partitions, let C(A), R(A) denote
the one that maximizes w′(R).
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Definition 1. For a parameter α > 0, a deterministic monotone algorithm has α-balanced thresholds if it
has the following property. For every input sequence σ, if A = A(σ) and V is a set disjoint from A such that
A ∪ V ∈ I, then ∑
xi∈A
Ti(σ) ≥
(
1
α
)
· E [w′(C(A))] (2)
∑
xi∈V
Ti(σ) ≤
(
1− 1
α
)
· E [w′(R(A))], (3)
where the expectation is over the random choice of w′.
Proposition 1. If a monotone algorithm has α-balanced thresholds, then it satisfies the following approxi-
mation guarantee against online weight-adaptive adversaries:
E [w(A)] ≥ 1
α
OPT. (4)
Proof. We have
OPT = E [w′(C(A)) + w′(R(A))] (5)
because C(A)∪R(A) is a maximum-weight basis with respect to w′, and w′ has the same distribution as w.
For any real number z, we will use the notation (z)+ to denote max{z, 0}. The proof will consist of deriving
the following three inequalities, in which wi stands for w(xi).
E
[∑
xi∈A
Ti
]
≥ 1
α
E [w′(C(A))] (6)
E
[∑
xi∈A
(wi − Ti)+
]
≥ E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
(w′(xi)− Ti)+
 (7)
E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
(w′(xi)− Ti)+
 ≥ 1
α
E [w′(R(A))]. (8)
Summing (6)-(8) and using the fact that Ti + (wi − Ti)+ = wi for all xi ∈ A, we obtain
E [w(A)] ≥ 1
α
E [w′(C(A))] +
1
α
E [w′(R(A))].
Inequality (6) is a restatement of the definition of α-balanced thresholds. Inequality (7) is deduced from
the following observations. First, the algorithm selects every i such that wi > Ti, so
∑
xi∈A(wi − Ti)+ =∑n
i=1(wi−Ti)+. Second, the online property of the algorithm and the fact that weight-adaptive adversaries
do not learn wi before choosing to reveal xi imply that Ti depends only on (x1, w1), . . . , (xi−1, wi−1) and that
the random variables w(xi), w
′(xi), Ti are independent. As wi = w(xi) and w′(xi) are identically distributed,
it follows that
E
[
n∑
i=1
(wi − Ti)+
]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
(w′(xi)− Ti)+
]
≥ E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
(w′(xi)− Ti)+
,
and (7) is established. Finally, we apply Property (3) of α-balanced thresholds, using the set V = R(A), to
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deduce that
E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
w′(xi)
 ≤ E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
Ti
+ E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
(w′(xi)− Ti)+

≤
(
1− 1
α
)
E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
w′(xi)
+ E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
(w′(xi)− Ti)+

1
α
E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
w′(xi)
 ≤ E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
(w′(xi)− Ti)+

Consequently (8) holds, which concludes the proof.
3.3 Achieving 2-balanced thresholds
This section presents an algorithm with 2-balanced thresholds. The algorithm is quite simple. In step i,
having already selected the (possibly empty) set Ai−1, we set threshold Ti = ∞ if Ai−1 ∪ {xi} 6∈ I, and
otherwise
Ti =
1
2E [w
′(R(Ai−1))− w′(R(Ai−1 ∪ {xi}))] (9)
= 12E [w
′(C(Ai−1 ∪ {xi}))− w′(C(Ai−1))] (10)
The algorithm selects element xi if and only if wi ≥ Ti. The fact that both (9) and (10) define the same
value of Ti is easy to verify. Let B denote the maximum weight basis of M with weights w′.
w′(C(Ai−1)) + w′(R(Ai−1)) = w′(B) = w′(C(Ai−1 ∪ {xi})) + w′(R(Ai−1 ∪ {xi}))
w′(R(Ai−1))− w′(R(Ai−1 ∪ {xi})) = w′(C(Ai−1 ∪ {xi}))− w′(C(Ai−1))
Property (2) in the definition of α-balanced thresholds follows from a telescoping sum.∑
xi∈A
Ti =
1
2
∑
xi∈A
E [w′(C(Ai−1 ∪ {xi}))− w′(C(Ai−1))]
= 12
∑
xi∈A
E [w′(C(Ai))− w′(C(Ai−1))]
= 12E [w
′(C(An))− w′(C(A0))] = 12E [w′(C(A))].
The remainder of this section is devoted to proving Property (3) in the definition of α-balanced thresholds.
In the present context, with α = 2 and thresholds Ti defined by (9), the property simply asserts that for
every pair of disjoint sets A, V such that A ∪ V ∈ I,
E
[∑
xi∈V
w′(R(Ai−1))− w′(R(Ai−1 ∪ {xi}))
]
= 2
∑
xi∈V
Ti(σ) ≤ E [w′(R(A))]
We will show, in fact, that this inequality holds for every non-negative weight assignment w′ and not merely
in expectation. The proof appears in Proposition 2 below. To establish it, we will need some basic properties
of matroids.
Definition 2 ([20], Section 39.3). If M is a matroid and S is a subset of its ground set, the deletion M−S
and the contraction M/S are two matroids with ground set U − S. A set T is independent in M− S if T
is independent in M, whereas T is independent in M/S if T ∪ S0 is independent in M, where S0 is any
maximal independent subset of S.
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Lemma 1. Suppose M = (U , I) is a matroid and V,R ∈ I are two independent sets of equal cardinality.
1. There is a bijection φ : V → R such that for every v ∈ V , (R− {φ(v)}) ∪ {v} is an independent set.
2. For a weight function w′ : U → R, suppose that R has the maximum weight of all |R|-element inde-
pendent subsets of V ∪R. Then the bijection φ in part 1 also satisfies w′(φ(v)) ≥ w′(v).
Proof. Part 1 is Corollary 39.12a in [20]. To prove part 2, simply observe that the weight of (R−{φ(v)})∪{v}
cannot be greater than the weight of R, by our assumptions on R and φ.
The next two lemmas establish basic properties of the function S 7→ R(S).
Lemma 2. For any independent set A, the set R(A) is equal to the maximum weight basis of M/A.
Proof. Let B be the maximum-weight basis of M. Among all bases of M/A that are contained in B, the
set R(A) is, by definition, the one of maximum weight. Therefore, if it is not the maximum-weight basis
of M/A, the only reason can be that there is another basis of M/A, not contained in B, having strictly
greater weight. But we know that the maximum-weight basis of M/A is selected by the greedy algorithm,
which iterates through the list y1, . . . , yk of elements of U −A sorted in order of decreasing weight, and picks
each element yi that is not contained in cl(A ∪ {y1, . . . , yi−1}). In particular, every yi chosen by the greedy
algorithm on M/A satisfies yi 6∈ cl({y1, . . . , yi−1}) and therefore belongs to B. Thus the maximum-weight
basis of M/A is contained in B and must equal R(A).
Lemma 3. For any independent set J , the function f(S) = w′(R(S)) is a submodular set function on subsets
of J .
Proof. For notational convenience, in this proof we will denote the union of two sets by ‘+’ rather than ‘∪’.
Also, we will not distinguish between an element x and the singleton set {x}.
To prove submodularity it suffices to consider an independent set S + x + y and to prove that f(S) −
f(S+x) ≤ f(S+ y)− f(S+x+ y). ReplacingM byM/S, we can reduce to the case that S = ∅ and prove
that f(∅)− f(x) ≤ f(y)− f(x+ y) whenever {x, y} is a two-element independent set.
What is the interpretation of f(∅) − f(x)? Recall that f(∅) = w′(R(∅)) is the weight of the maximum-
weight basis B of M. Similarly, f(x) is the weight of the maximum-weight basis Bx of M/{x}. Let
b1, b2, . . . , br denote the elements of B in decreasing order of weight. Consider running two executions of
the greedy algorithm to select B and Bx in parallel. The only step in which the algorithms make differing
decisions is the first step i in which {b1, . . . , bi} ∪ {x} contains a circuit. In this step, bi is included in B
but excluded from Bx. Similarly, when we run two executions of the greedy algorithm to select By and
Bxy — the maximum-weight bases ofM/{y} andM/{x, y}, respectively — the only step in which differing
decisions are made is the earliest step j in which {b1, . . . , bj} ∪ {x, y} contains a circuit. But j certainly
cannot be later than i, since {b1, . . . , bi} ∪ {x, y} is a superset of {b1, . . . , bi} ∪ {x} and hence contains a
circuit. We may conclude that
f(∅)− f(x) = bi ≤ bj = f(y)− f(x+ y),
and hence f is submodular as claimed.
Proposition 2. For any disjoint sets A, V such that A ∪ V ∈ I,∑
xi∈V
w′(R(Ai−1))− w′(R(Ai−1 ∪ {xi})) ≤ w′(R(A)).
Proof. The function f(S) = w′(R(S)) is submodular on subsets S ⊆ A ∪ V , by Lemma 3. Hence∑
xi∈V
w′(R(Ai−1))− w′(R(Ai−1 ∪ {xi})) ≤
∑
x∈V
w′(R(A))− w′(R(A ∪ {x})). (11)
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Apply Lemma 1 to the independent sets V,R(A) inM/A to obtain a bijection φ such that w′(φ(x)) ≥ w′(x)
and A∪ (R(A)− φ(x))∪ {x} ∈ I for all x ∈ V . By definition of R(·), we know that A∪ {x} ∪R(A∪ {x}) is
the maximum weight independent subset of A∪{x}∪B that contains A∪{x}. One such set is A∪ (R(A)−
φ(x)) ∪ {x}, so
w′(A) + w′(R(A))− w′(φ(x)) + w′(x) ≤ w′(A) + w′(R(A ∪ {x})) + w′(x)
w′(R(A))− w′(R(A ∪ {x})) ≤ w′(φ(x))∑
x∈V
w′(R(A))− w′(R(A ∪ {x})) ≤
∑
x∈V
w′(φ(x)) = w′(R). (12)
The proposition follows by combining (11) and (12).
4 Matroid intersections
Our algorithm and proof for matroid intersections is quite similar. We need to modify some definitions and
extend some proofs, but the spirit is the same.
4.1 A generalization of α-balanced thresholds
We first have to extend our notation a bit. Denote the independent sets for the p matroids as I1, . . . , Ip.
Denote the “truly independent” sets as I = ∩jIj . Still let w,w′ : U → R+ denote two assignments of
weights to U , both sampled indepedently from the given distribution. We consider running the algorithm on
an input sequence σ = (x1, w(x1)), . . . , (xn, w(xn)) and comparing the value of its selected set, A = A(σ),
with that of the B ∈ I that maximizes w′(B). For all j, the matroid exchange axiom ensures that there is
at least one way to partition B into disjoint subsets Cj , Rj such that A ∪ Rj ∈ Ij , and B ⊆ clj(A ∪ Rj).
Among all such partitions, let Cj(A), Rj(A) denote the one that maximizes w
′(Rj) (greedily add elements
from B to Rj unless it creates a dependency in Ij). We denote by R(A) = ∩jRj(A) and C(A) = ∪jCj(A).
Definition 3. For a parameter α > 0, a deterministic monotone algorithm has α-balanced thresholds if it
has the following property. For every input sequence σ, if A = A(σ) and V is a set disjoint from A such that
A ∪ V ∈ I, then
∑
xi∈A
Ti(σ) ≥
(
1
α
)
· E
∑
j
w′(Cj(A))
 (13)
∑
xi∈V
Ti(σ) ≤
(
1
α
)
· E
∑
j
w′(Rj(A))
, (14)
where the expectation is over the random choice of w′.
Proposition 3. If a monotone algorithm has α-balanced thresholds for α ≥ 2, then it satisfies the following
approximation guarantee against weight-adaptive adversaries when I is the intersection of p matroids:
E [w(A)] ≥ α− p
α(α− 1)OPT. (15)
The proof closely parallels the proof of Proposition 1, and is given in the appendix.
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4.2 Obtaining α-balanced thresholds
This section presents an algorithm obtaining α-balanced thresholds for any α > 1. One can take a derivative
to see that the optimal choice of α for the intersection of p matroids is αp = p+
√
p(p− 1). For simplicity, we
will instead just use α = 2p, as this is nearly optimal and always at least 2. When α = 2p, the approximation
guarantee from Proposition 3 is 14p−2 .
We now define our thresholds. Let
T (A, i, j) =
1
α
E [w′(Rj(A))− w′(Rj(A ∪ {xi}))]
=
1
α
E [w′(Cj(A ∪ {xi}))− w′(Cj(A))]
T (A, i) =
∑
j
T (A, i, j).
In step i, having already selected the (possibly empty) set Ai−1, we set threshold Ti =∞ if Ai−1 ∪ {i} /∈ I,
and Ti = T (Ai−1, i) otherwise. In other words, each T (A, i, j) is basically the same as the threshold used for
the single matroid algorithm if Ij was the only matroid constraint. It is not exactly the same, because R(A)
when Ij is the only matroid is not the same as Rj(A) in the presence of other matroid constraints. T (A, i)
just sums T (A, i, j) over all matroids.
The proof of Equation (13) follows exactly the proof of Equation (2).
The proof of Equation (14) follows from Proposition 2, although perhaps not obviously. As A ∪ V ∈ I,
we clearly have A∪ V ∈ Ij for all j. So the hypotheses of Proposition 2 are satisfied for all j. Summing the
bound we get in Proposition 2 over all j gives us Equation (14).
5 Lower Bounds
Here we provide two examples. The first is the well-known example of [16] showing that the factor of 2 is
tight for matroids. We present their construction here for completeness. The second shows that the ratio
O(p) is tight for the intersection of p matroids.
We start with the well-known example of [16]. Consider the 1-uniform matroid over 2 elements. We have
w(1) = 1 with probability 1, w(2) = n with probability 1/n and 0 otherwise. Then the prophet obtains
2 − 1/n in expectation, but the gambler obtains at most 1, as his optimal strategy is just to take the first
element always.
The example for the intersection of p matroids has appeared in other forms in [3, 5]. Let q be a prime
between p/2 and p. Then let U = {(i, j) | 0 ≤ i ≤ qq − 1, 0 ≤ j ≤ q − 1}. Then let I contain all sets of the
form {(i, j1), . . . , (i, jx)}. Now let w(i, j) = 1 with probability 1/q, and w(i, j) = 0 otherwise, for all i, j.
Reveal the elements in any order. No matter what strategy the gambler uses to pick the first element, his
optimal strategy from that point on is to just accept every remaining element with the same first coordinate.
However the gambler winds up with his first element, he makes at most 1 − 1/q in expectation from the
remaining elements he is allowed to pick (as there are at most q − 1 remaining elements, and each has
E [w(i, j)] = 1/q). Therefore, the expected payoff to the gambler is less than 2. However, with probability
at least (1 − 1/e), there exists an i such that w(i, j) = 1 for all j (as the probability that this occurs for a
fixed i is 1/qq and there are qq different i’s). So the expected payoff to the prophet is Θ(q).
Finally, we just have to show that I can be written as the intersection of q matroids. Let Ix be the
partition matroid that partitions U into unionsqjSj = unionsqj ∪i {(i, xi + j (mod q))}, and requires that only one
element of each Sj be chosen. Then clearly, I ⊆ ∩x∈ZqIx as any two elements with the same first coordinate
lie in different partitions in each of the Ix. In addition, ∩x∈ZqIx ⊆ I. Consider any (i, j) and (i′, j′) with
i 6= i′. Then when (j − j′) (mod q) = x(i− i′) (mod q), (i, j) and (i′, j′) are in the same partition of Ix. As
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q is prime, this equation always has a solution. Therefore, we have shown that I = ∩x∈ZqIx, and I can be
written as the intersection of q ≤ p matroids. As the prophet obtains Θ(p) in expectation, and the gambler
obtains less than 2 in expectation, no algorithm can achieve an approximation factor better than O(p).
6 Interpretation as OPMs
Here, we describe how to use our algorithm to design OPMs for unit-demand multi-parameter bidders
under matroid and matroid intersection feasibility constraints. We begin by recalling the definition of
Bayesian multi-parameter unit-demand mechanism design (BMUMD) from [5]. In any such mechanism
design problem, there is a set of services, U , partitioned into disjoint subsets J1, . . . , Jn, one for each bidder.
The mechanism must allocate a set of services, subject to downward-closed feasibility constraints given by a
collection I of feasible subsets. We assume that the feasibility constraints guarantee that no bidder receives
more than a single service, i.e. that the intersection of any feasible set with one of the sets Ji contains no
more than one element. (If this property is not already implied by the given feasibility constraints, it can
be ensured by intersecting the given constraints with one additional partition matroid constraint.)
As in the work of Chawla et al. [5], we assume that each bidder i’s values for the services in set Ji are
independent random variables, and we analyze BMUMD mechanisms for any such distribution by exploring
a closely-related single-parameter domain that we denote by Icopies. In Icopies there are |U| bidders, each of
whom wants just a single service x and has a value vx for receiving that service. The feasibility constraints
are the same in both domains — the mechanism may select any set of services that belongs to I — and the
joint distribution of the values vx (x ∈ I) is the same as well; the only difference between the two domains
is that an individual bidder i in the BMUMD problem becomes a set of competing bidders (corresponding
to the elements of Ji) in the domain Icopies. As might be expected, the increase in competition between
bidders results in an increase in revenue for the optimal mechanism; indeed, the following lemma from [5]
will be a key step in our analysis.
Lemma 4. Let A be any individually rational and truthful deterministic mechanism for instance I of
BMUMD. Then the expected revenue of A is no more than the expected revenue of the optimal mechanism
for Icopies.
A second technique that we will borrow from [5] (and, ultimately, from Myerson’s original paper on
optimal mechanism design [18]), is the technique of analyzing the expected revenue of mechanisms indirectly
via their virtual surplus. We begin by reviewing the definitions of virtual valuations and virtual surplus.
Assume that vx, the value of bidder i for item x ∈ Ji, has cumulative distribution function Fx whose density
fx is well-defined and positive on the interval on which vx is supported. Then the virtual valuation function
φx is defined by
φx(v) = v − 1− Fx(v)
fx(v)
,
and the virtual surplus of an allocation A ∈ I is defined to be the sum ∑x∈A φx(vx). Myerson [18] proved
the following:
Lemma 5. In single-parameter domains whose bidders have independent valuations with monotone increas-
ing virtual valuation functions, the expected revenue of any mechanism in Bayes-Nash equilibrium is equal
to its expected virtual surplus.
The distribution of vx is said to be regular when the virtual valuation function φx is monotonically
increasing. We will assume throughout the rest of this section that bidders’ values have regular distributions,
in order to apply Lemma 5. To deal with non-regular distributions, it is necessary to use a technique known
as ironing, also due to Myerson [18], which in our context translates into randomized pricing via a recipe
described in Lemma 2 of [5].
11
Algorithm 1: Mechanism M for unit-demand multi-dimensional bidders
1: Initialize A = ∅.
2: for i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
3: for all x ∈ Ji do
4: Set price px =
{
φ−1x (T (A, x)) if A ∪ {x} ∈ I
∞ otherwise.
5: end for
6: Post price vector (px)x∈Ji .
7: Bidder i chooses an element x ∈ Ji (or nothing) at these posted prices.
8: if x is chosen then
9: Allocate x to bidder i and charge price px.
10: A← A ∪ {x}
11: else
12: Allocate nothing to bidder i and charge price 0.
13: end if
14: end for
Our plan is now to design truthful mechanisms M and Mcopies for the BMUMD domain I and the
associated single-parameter domain Icopies, respectively, and to relate them to the optimal mechanisms for
those domains via the following chain of inequalities.
R(M) ≥ R(Mcopies) = Φ(Mcopies) ≥ 1
α
Φ(OPTcopies) =
1
α
R(OPTcopies) ≥ 1
α
R(OPT). (16)
Here, R(·) and Φ(·) denote the expected revenue and expected virtual surplus of a mechanism, respectively,
and α denotes the approximation guarantee of a prophet inequality algorithm embedded in our mechanism.
Thus, α = 2 when I is a matroid, and more generally α = 4p − 2 when I is given by an intersection of p
matroid constraints.
Most of the steps in line (16) are already justified by the lemmas from prior work discussed above. The
relation R = Φ for mechanisms Mcopies and OPTcopies is a consequence of Lemma 5, while the relation
R(OPTcopies) ≥ R(OPT) is Lemma 4. We will naturally derive the relation Φ(Mcopies) ≥ 1αΦ(OPTcopies)
as a consequence of the prophet inequality. To do so, it suffices to define mechanism Mcopies such that its
allocation decisions result from running the prophet inequality algorithm on an input sequence consisting of
the virtual valuations φx(vx), presented in an order determined by an online weight-adaptive adversary. The
crux of our proof will consist of designing said adversary to ensure that the relation R(M) ≥ R(Mcopies)
also holds.
Given these preliminaries, we now describe the mechanismsM andMcopies. Central to both mechanisms
is a pricing scheme using thresholds T (A, x), defined as the threshold Ts that our online algorithm would
use at step s when xs = x and the algorithm has accepted the set A so far. (Contrary to previous sections of
the paper in which steps of the online algorithm’s execution were denoted by i, here we reserve the variable
i to refer to bidders in the mechanism, using s instead to denote a step of the online algorithm. Note that
the thresholds assigned by our algorithm depend only on A and x, not on s, hence the notation T (A, x) is
justified.) Mechanism M, described by the pseudocode in Algorithm 1, simply makes posted-price offers
to bidders 1, 2, . . . , n in that order, defining the posted price for each item by applying its inverse-virtual-
valuation function to the threshold that the prophet inequality algorithm sets for that item.
To define mechanism Mcopies, we first define an online weight-adaptive adversary and then run the
prophet inequality algorithm on the input sequence presented by this adversary, using its thresholds to define
posted prices exactly as in mechanism M above. The adversary is designed to minimize the mechanism’s
revenue, subject to the constraint that the elements are presented in an order that runs through all of the
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Algorithm 2: Online weight-adaptive adversary for Icopies
1: for i = n, n− 1, . . . , 1 do // Preprocessing loop: fill in dynamic programming table
2: for all feasible sets A ⊆ J1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ji do
3: if i = n then
4: V (A, i) = 0
5: else
6: px = φ
−1
x (T (A, x)) for all x ∈ Ji+1.
7: Sort Ji+1 in order of increasing px + V (A ∪ {x}, i+ 1).
8: Denote this sorted list by x1, . . . , xk.
9: Compute V (A, i) using formula (17).
10: end if
11: end for
12: end for
13: // Main loop: choose the ordering of each set Ji
14: Initialize A = ∅.
15: for i = 1, . . . , n do
16: px = φ
−1
x (T (A, x)) for all x ∈ Ji.
17: Sort the elements of Ji in order of increasing px + V (A ∪ {x}, i− 1).
18: Present the elements of Ji to the online algorithm in this order.
19: if ∃x ∈ Ji s.t. vx ≥ px then
20: Find the first such x in the ordering of Ji, and insert x into A.
21: end if
22: end for
elements of J1, then the elements of J2, and so on. In fact, it is easy to compute this worst-case ordering
by backward induction, which yields a dynamic program presented in pseudocode as Algorithm 2. The
dynamic programming table consists of entries V (A, i) denoting the expected revenue that Mcopies will
gain from selling elements of the set Ji+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Jn, given that it has already allocated the elements of A.
Computing and storing these values requires exponential time and space, but we are not concerned with
makingMcopies into a computationally efficient mechanism because its role in this paper is merely to provide
an intermediate step in the analysis of mechanism M.
The formula for V (A, i) is guided by the following considerations. Since Mcopies will post prices px =
φ−1x (T (A, x)) for all x ∈ Ji+1 given that it has already allocated A, it will not allocate any element of Ji+1
if vx < px for all x ∈ Ji+1, and otherwise it will allocate some element x ∈ Ji+1. In the former case, its
expected revenue from the remaining elements will be V (A, i+ 1). In the latter case, it extracts revenue px
from bidder i+1 and expected revenue V (A∪{x}, i+1) from the remaining bidders. Thus, an adversary who
wishes the minimize the revenue obtained by the mechanism will order the elements x ∈ Ji+1 in increasing
order of px + V (A ∪ {x}, i+ 1). Denoting the elements of Ji+1 in this order by x1, x2, . . . , xk, we obtain the
formula
V (A, i) =
 k∏
j=1
Fxj (pxj )
·V (A, i+1) + k∑
`=1
`−1∏
j=1
Fxj (pxj )
·(1−Fx`(px`))·(px`+V (A∪{x`}, i+1)). (17)
The first term on the right side accounts for the possibility that bidder i + 1 buys nothing, while the sum
accounts for the possibility that bidder i+ 1 buys x`, for each ` = 1, . . . , k.
Mechanism Mcopies has already been described above, and is specified by pseudocode in Algorithm 3.
We note that Mcopies does not satisfy the definition of an OPM in [5], since the price px for x ∈ Ji may
depend on the bids by for y ∈ J1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ji−1. However, it retains a key property of OPMs that make them
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Algorithm 3: Mechanism Mcopies for single-parameter domain Icopies.
1: // Set prices using adversary coupled with online algorithm
2: Obtain bids bx for all bidders x ∈ U .
3: Run Algorithm 2, using vx = bx for all x, to obtain an ordering of U .
4: Set w(x) = φx(bx) for all x ∈ U .
5: Present the pairs (x,w(x)) to the prophet inequality algorithm, in the order computed above.
6: Obtain thresholds T (A, x) from the prophet inequality algorithm.
7: Set price px = φ
−1
x (T (A, x)) for all x ∈ U .
8: // Determine allocation and payments
9: Initialize A = ∅
10: for i = 1, . . . , n do
11: for all x ∈ Ji do
12: if bx ≥ px and by < py for all y ∈ Ji that precede x in the ordering then
13: Add x to the set A.
14: Charge price px to bidder x.
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
suitable for analyzing multi-parameter mechanisms: the prices of elements of Ji are predetermined before
any of the bids in Ji are revealed.
Theorem 1. MechanismM for BMUMD settings with independent regular valuations obtains a 2-approximation
to the revenue of the optimal deterministic mechanism for matroid feasibility constraints, and a (4p − 2)-
approximation to the revenue of the optimal deterministic mechanism for feasibility constraints that are the
intersection of p matroids.
Proof. Both M and Mcopies are posted-price (hence, truthful) mechanisms that always output a feasible
allocation. To prove that the allocation is always feasible, one can argue by contradiction: if not, there must
be a step in which the set A becomes infeasible through adding an element x. However, in both M and
Mcopies, we can see that the price px is infinite in that case, while bid bx is greater than or equal to px, a
contradiction.
The proof of the approximate revenue guarantee follows the outline given by equation (16) above. As
explained earlier, the only two steps in that equation that do not follow from prior work are the relations
R(M) ≥ R(Mcopies) (18)
Φ(Mcopies) ≥ 1
α
Φ(OPTcopies). (19)
To justify the second line, observe that the “adversary” (Algorithm 2) that computes the ordering of the bids
is an online weight-adaptive adversary. This is because the adversary does not need to observe the values
vx (x ∈ Ji) in order to sort the elements of Ji in order of increasing px+V (A∪{x}, i−1). Thus, the prophet
inequality algorithm running on the input sequence specified by the adversary achieves an expected virtual
surplus that is at least 1αΦ(OPT
copies). Furthermore, the set of elements selected by Mcopies is exactly the
same as the set of elements selected by the prophet inequality algorithm — the criterion bx ≥ px is equivalent
to the criterion w(x) ≥ T (A, x) because w(x) = φx(bx), T (A, x) = φx(px), and φ is monotone increasing.
This completes the proof of (19).
To prove (18) we use an argument that, in effect, justifies our claim that Algorithm 2 is a worst-case
adversary for mechanism Mcopies. Specifically, for each i = 0, . . . , n and each feasible set A ⊆ J1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ji,
let R(M, A, i) and R(Mcopies, A, i) denote the expected revenue thatM (respectively,Mcopies) obtains from
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selling items in Ji+1 ∪ · · · Jn conditional on having allocated set A while processing the bids in J1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ji.
(In evaluating the expected revenue of the two mechanisms, we assume that the bidders are presented toM
in the order i = 1, . . . , n, and that they are presented to Mcopies in the order determined by the adversary,
Algorithm 2.) We will prove, by downward induction on i, that
∀i, A R(M, A, i) ≥ R(Mcopies, A, i) = V (A, i)
and then (18) follows by specializing to i = 0, A = ∅. When i = n, we have R(M, A, i) = R(Mcopies, A, i) =
V (A, i) = 0 so the base case of the induction is trivial. The relation R(Mcopies, A, i) = V (A, i) for i < n is
justified by the discussion preceding equation (17). To prove R(M, A, i) ≥ R(Mcopies, A, i), suppose that
both mechanisms have allocated set A while processing the bids in J1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ji. Conditional on the set of
x ∈ Ji+1 such that vx ≥ px being equal to any specified set K, we will prove that M obtains at least as
much expected revenue as Mcopies from selling the elements of Ji+1 ∪ · · · ∪ Jn. If K is empty, then the two
mechanisms will obtain expected revenue R(M, A, i+1) and R(Mcopies, A, i+1), respectively, from elements
of Ji+1 ∪ · · · ∪Jn, and the claim follows from the induction hypothesis. Otherwise,Mcopies obtains expected
revenue min{px + V (A ∪ {x}, i+ 1) | x ∈ K} while M obtains expected revenue py + R(M, A ∪ {y}, i+ 1)
where y ∈ K is the element of K chosen by bidder i+ 1 when presented with the menu of posted prices for
the elements of Ji+1. The induction hypothesis implies
py +R(M, A ∪ {y}, i+ 1) ≥ py + V (A ∪ {y}, i+ 1) ≥ min{px + V (A ∪ {x}, i+ 1) | x ∈ K},
and this completes the proof.
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A Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We have
OPT = E [w′(Cj(A)) + w′(Rj(A))] ∀j (20)
OPT = E [w′(C(A)) + w′(R(A))] (21)
because Cj(A)∪Rj(A) is a maximum-weight independent set with respect to w′ for all j, as is C(A)∪R(A),
and w′ has the same distribution as w. The proof will again consist of deriving the following three inequalities.
E
[∑
xi∈A
Ti
]
≥ 1
α
E
∑
j
w′(Cj(A))
 (22)
E
[∑
xi∈A
(wi − Ti)+
]
≥ E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
(w′(xi)− Ti)+
 (23)
E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
(w′(xi)− Ti)+
 ≥ E [w′(R(A))]− 1
α
E
∑
j
w′(Rj(A))
. (24)
Summing (22) + (23) + 1α−1 (24) and using the fact that Ti + (wi − Ti)+ = wi for all xi ∈ A, we obtain
E [w(A)] ≥
(
1
α− 1 −
1
α(α− 1)
)
E
∑
j
w′(Cj(A))
+ α− 2
α− 1E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
(w′(xi)− Ti)+

+
1
α− 1E [w
′(R(A))]− 1
α(α− 1)E
∑
j
w′(Rj(A))
.
Subsituting in Equations (20) and (21) (and observing that α−2α−1 ≥ 0 whenever α ≥ 2), we get:
E [w(A)] ≥ 1
α− 1OPT−
p
α(α− 1)OPT =
α− p
α(α− 1)OPT
It remains to show that Equations (22) - (24) hold for any α-balanced thresholds. Equation (22) is
again a restatement of the definition of α-balanced thresholds. Inequality (23) is deduced from the same
observations as Equation (7). Finally, as in Proposition 1, we apply Property (14) of α-balanced thresholds,
using the set V = R(A), to deduce that
E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
w′(xi)
 ≤ E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
Ti
+ E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
(w′(xi)− Ti)+

≤ 1
α
E
∑
j
w′(Rj(A))
+ E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
(w′(xi)− Ti)+

E [w′(R(A))]− 1
α
E
∑
j
w′(Rj(A))
 ≤ E
 ∑
xi∈R(A)
(w′(xi)− Ti)+

Consequently (24) holds, which concludes the proof.
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